My second book Digital Contention in a Divided Society is due out in paperback on 26 March 2024. It will include a new chapter that explores the role of online platforms in contentious events between 2016 and 2023. It will be on sale for £20 (much more affordable than the hardback version).
Many thanks to Rob Byron and the Manchester University Press team for their help in bringing this to fruition. I am also told there may be a new cover- more on this soon.
I am hoping do do some in-person book talks this time (when the book was launched in 2021 this wasn’t possible due to COVID-19 regulations). I will post details of these on here when they are confirmed. If you are interested in hosting one of these talks then please do contact me (paul.reilly@glasgow.ac.uk).
The updated version of Digital Contention can be preordered here
Virpi Salojärvi (University of Helsinki/University of Vassa) and I are pleased to announce the publication of our co-edited book (De)constructing societal threats during times of deep mediatization today. A description of the book can be found below:
This book explores how both elite and non-elite actors frame societal threats such as the refugee crisis and COVID-19 using both digital and traditional media. It also explores ways in which the framing of these issues as threatening can be challenged using these platforms.
People typically experience societal threats such as war and terrorism through the media they consume, both on and offline. Much of the research in this area to date focuses on either how political and media elites present these issues to citizens, or audience responses to these frames. This book takes a different approach by focusing on how issues such as the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic are both constructed and deconstructed in an era of hybrid media. It draws on a range of traditional and innovative research methodologies to explore how these issues are framed as ‘threats’ within deeply mediatized societies, ranging from content analysis of newspaper coverage of the Macedonian name dispute in Greece to investigating conspiratorial communities on YouTube using Systemic Functional Linguistics. In doing so, this book enriches our understanding of not only how civil and uncivil actors frame these issues, but also their impact on societal resilience towards future crises.
(De)constructing Societal Threats During Times of Deep Mediatization will be a key resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of Communication Studies, Media Studies, Journalism, Cultural Studies, Research Methods, Sociology and Politics.
The chapters included in this book were originally published as a special issue of The Communication Review. Many thanks to our authors for their excellent contributions, which are listed below:
1. Framing the Macedonian name dispute in Greece: Nationalistic journalism and the existential threat Minos-Athanasios Karyotakis
2. The “ultimate empathy machine” as technocratic solutionism? Audience reception of the distant refugee crisis through virtual reality Zhe Xu and Mengrong Zhang
3. A systemic functional linguistics approach to analysing white supremacist and conspiratorial Ddscourse on YouTube Olivia Inwood and Michele Zappavigna
4. Internet regulation and crisis-related resilience: From Covid-19 to existential risks Gregory Asmolov
Scotland’s distinctive public sphere: a media policy roundtable
This roundtable will explore Scotland’s distinctive media and public sphere, with a particular focus on questions of sustainability in respect of funding, trust and the changing regulatory landscape. It contextualises these questions in a turbulent political environment, in which the constitutional question continues to dominate, and the radical changes brought by digital technologies.
Devolution in 1999 significantly shifted Scotland’s political landscape, and 2014’s referendum illuminated the way in which Scotland’s public sphere has developed in parallel as an often uncomfortable hybrid of UK-rooted institutions and emerging Scottish players. Analysis of media structures in the devolved state have however often been subsumed under UK-wide research which can fail to fully illuminate Scotland’s distinct challenges and nature.
This roundtable draws on a recent stakeholder report produced by academics at Glasgow University. Speakers will share insights on a set of key themes including sustainable funding and support for Scotland’s media and how it works in other small countries, digital regulation and competition, holding power to account in Scotland, and the impacts of global digital media on engagement with local issues. It will then invite contributions from the panel speakers and audiences about the future trajectory of Scotland’s media in the next decade.
Participants will include:
Dr Paul Reilly, Senior Lecturer, Politics Dr Catherine Happer, Director of Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG), Sociology Professor Philip Schlesinger, Professor in Cultural Theory, and Dr Dominic Hinde, Lecturer, Sociology.
Tomorrow (5 September), I will be presenting a paper based on a project that explored social media, sectarianism and football in Scotland. The panel, entitled Scottish Media and Culture, place at 9am in Room W010B (Annie Lennox Building). The abstract can be read below.
#ScotlandsShame: Twitter, affective publics and football-related sectarianism in Scotland
Social media have frequently been identified as a significant contributing factor to sectarianism in contemporary Scotland. What is typically absent from these debates is empirical evidence showing the prevalence of sectarianism on online platforms in relation to football, and specifically how the rivalry between Celtic and Rangers fans is contested online. This paper sets out to address this gap through a qualitative study of tweets (N=84,028) posted during the disorder that followed the Rangers ‘title celebrations’ in Glasgow city centre on 15 May 2021. Results indicate that there was much evidence of dehumanising and sectarian language being used to ‘other’ Rangers supporters. Hashtags like #ScotlandsShame were used by citizens to document their experiences of what they perceived as the ‘anti-Catholic bigotry’ on display in the city centre that evening. The Scottish establishment was criticised for not doing enough to eliminate this bigotry, whether it be in the form of banning contentious Orange Order marches or abolishing segregation within schools. In response, Rangers supporters accused the Scottish Government of having an agenda against their club, as demonstrated by its failure to condemn the anti-deportation protests at Kenmure Street a few days earlier. In this way, social media afforded these affective publics opportunities to contest the dominant media narratives on both the Celtic-Rangers rivalry and football-related sectarianism in Scotland. The paper concludes by considering whether the sectarianism visible on online platforms during such contentious events is reflective of broader societal trends.
Ceri Ashwell and I have a chapter in the book based on our work on the Mary Beard Twitterstorm (see here for an article we previously published in Information, Communication & Society).
The title and abstract for the chapter are below:
Resisting (everyday) racism on social media: Analysing responses to the 2018 Mary Beard Twitter-storm
Big tech companies like Twitter have often been accused of not doing enough to address online hate speech. The algorithms and designs of social media have facilitated new forms of platformed racism in countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom (UK). While they undoubtedly amplify cyber hate, these online platforms also constitute important spaces in which people of colour (PoC), and their allies, can challenge colorblind racism and white privilege within contemporary societies. This chapter uses the 2018 Mary Beard Twitterstorm to explore how Twitter is used by activists to both highlight and counteract these tropes. The Cambridge scholar was heavily criticised by anti-racist activists for a tweet which appeared to condone the sexual misconduct of Oxfam aid workers in Haiti following an earthquake in January 2010. Her reference to the difficulty of ‘sustaining civilised values’ in the disaster zone was considered prima facie evidence of her whiteness and privilege. Researchers of colour, such as Beard’s Cambridge colleague Dr. Priya Gopal used the tweet to reflect on the ‘casual racism’ they experienced working in UK Higher Education institutions. These acts of resistance towards racial inequality and injustice within the academy led to Gopal herself being subject to much abuse and trolling from Beard’s supporters. This paper sets out to explore whether these acts of resistance can facilitate informal learning about issues pertaining to white privilege and frailty in countries such as the UK. It does so by reviewing the literature on social media and whiteness, providing background on the Mary Beard Twitterstorm, and presenting the results of a qualitative content analysis of 1718 unique tweets containing ‘Mary Beard’, posted between 16 and 20 February 2018. Results indicate that there were nearly twice as many tweets criticising the Cambridge scholar for perpetuating white privilege and frailty than defending her tweet. While many of these tweets were agonistic rather than antagonistic in nature, there was little sign that those talking about the controversy on the site were reflecting on their own white privilege. The burden of talking about these issues fell on the few PoC in the study, who were invariably singled out for abuse by Beard’s supporters. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates the crucial role of opinion leaders such as Gopal in leading difficult conversations about racism and whiteness online.
Many thanks to Stamatis, Anastasia and Maria for the invitation to participate and their hard work in pulling together such a great book on social movements and activism.
The book can be ordered here. If you would like a preprint copy of our chapter then please contact me (paul.reilly@glasgow.ac.uk).
We discussed the privacy concerns raised in relation to Threads, whether it can replace the immediacy and news of Twitter, and what politicians hope to gain from setting up accounts on the new platform.
A few selected quotes are below:
On the future for Twitter if Threads continues to grow in popularity:
“I do wonder if it doesn’t have the key functionality of Twitter, which is to break news and tofollow things, and that’s hashtag focused. To me, it probably has a limit in terms of how manypeople will give up on Twitter completely and move there. Unless Twitter does collapse and maybe that does happen“.
On whether people will migrate from Twitter to Threads in large numbers:
“I think it’s harder to pack up and move an entire group of people there [..] Particularly when they’re used to the kind of rhythms of Twitter and whether it’s following events or following things which are breaking“.
On why politicians might sign up to Threads:
“But there is a question mark there about these platforms, it’s as if almost every politician or party has to be on them because they think that’s where they’re going to reach younger people“
Last week I attended an event in Glasgow marking twenty five years of the Good Friday Agreement. There were vivid recollections from former Ulster Unionist Party leader Mike Nesbitt about his experiences as a journalist reporting on the talks at Castle Buildings from the car park outside. Professor Monica McWilliamsrecounted the sexism and misogyny experienced by members of the NI Women’s Coalition both during and after the negotiations. However, it was former SDLP leader and Deputy First Minister Mark Durkan’s reflections on how social media creates a cycle of ‘reacting to reactions’ that particularly resonated. He suggested that it would have been much harder to achieve the Good Friday Agreement in the context of the polarised political debates on social media today.
Yet it would be premature to suggest that online platforms have no potential to promote reconciliation in societies transitioning out of conflict. I found that the most significant peacebuilding contribution of social media was its empowerment of citizens to correct misinformation and disinformation that had the potential to generate sectarian violence. Such false information appeared to have a relatively short lifespan, due in no small part to the fact that tweeters had corrected them and professional journalists had chosen not to share these social media posts in their coverage of these events. Furthermore, it was apparent that much of the social media activity followed contentious parades and protests with little evidence it was directly influencing events on the ground. While it might be convenient to blame platforms like Facebook and Twitter for intercommunal violence, it was the context in which they were used that shaped the interactions between members of rival communities. During periods of political instability the publics mobilised on social media can both help and hinder efforts to moderate sectarian tensions in these contexts.
Would the peace process of the mid-nineties have been possible in the social media era? Certainly it would appear more difficult to keep negotiations private. Journalists like Nesbitt are no longer left outside in the car park looking in. Those within Castle Buildings would also have been subject to much online hate speech, misinformation and trolling by those who opposed the peace process. Yet, it does a disservice to those who negotiated the Agreement to believe that it would have been derailed by such online chatter and noise. While acknowledging the imperfect nature of the Agreement, Monica McWilliams suggested that the leaders of the main parties had the courage not only to compromise but also to explain why they had done so to their respective communities. Fast forward to 2023 and relations between the two largest parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, remain fractious. Both have collapsed the powersharing institutions at various points in the past decade; most recently, the DUP have refused to take their seats in the Executive unless the Northern Ireland Protocol and the so-called ‘Irish Sea Border’ created by the UK’s EU Withdrawal Agreement are removed. The politicisation of issues such as a proposed Irish language act has reverberated online as supporters of these parties engage in whataboutery and accuse each other of bad faith. Perhaps the current generation of political leaders need to heed the words of Nobel Peace Prize winner John Hume:
Media and Conflict Memory: an Interdisciplinary Workshop
University of Glasgow, 22-23 November 2023.
Media are integral to how we both remember and forget conflict. While individuals refer to the family photo album, the collective memories of communities are often shaped by iconic photographs of traumatic events such as popular uprisings, terrorist attacks, and wars. This memory work was traditionally confined to repositories such as historical archives, museums and institutions. In recent years the ‘connective turn’ has ‘unmoored’ memory from these institutions, replacing traditional notions of collective memory with the searchable ‘memory of the multitude’ online (Hoskins, 2017). The automated systems of online platforms like Facebook ‘dig’ for memories on behalf of their users, including those of (Jacobsen and Beer, 2021). Historical photographs shared on photo sharing sites like Instagram facilitate informal learning about events such as the Holocaust among younger generations (Commane and Potton, 2019). This has empowered a new generation of memory activists who leverage the affordances of online platforms for commemoration rituals (Fridman, 2022). More recently, apps like Telegram have made it easier to document human rights violations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whilst simultaneously creating a curated, unsanitized ‘war feed’ for global audiences (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2023).
This hybrid workshop seeks to advance the discussion about the role of media in conflict memory work. We adopt a purposefully broad definition of conflict which includes (but is not limited to) armed insurrections, civil disorder, geopolitical interstate conflict, political violence in divided societies, terrorist attacks, and wars.
We are looking for original and creative contributions that demonstrate the broad range of methodologies (e.g. qualitative, quantitative, digital) in this emergent field. Abstract submissions should explicitly address the role of media (e.g. newspapers, social media, television) in conflict memory. We will accept both theoretical and empirical studies provided they are relevant to the workshop’s key themes.
Possible topics for the workshop include:
Conflict memory, media and education
Mediatization of war, terrorism, armed conflict and civil disorder
Journalistic practice and collective memories of conflict
Media and conflict memory in post and neo-authoritarian societies
Memory activism after conflict
Radio, memory and conflict
Social media and conflict memory
Television news and audience understanding of conflict
We especially encourage submissions from early career researchers and those based in Global South countries. There will be a limited number of travel bursaries available for those traveling to Glasgow to attend in-person.
Abstracts of 300-500 words, excluding references, should be sent to paul.reilly@glasgow.ac.uk and virpi.salojarvi@helsinki.fi. Please indicate on your submission whether you will attend in-person or online, and if you wish to be considered for a travel bursary should your abstract be accepted. There will be no registration fee for participants accepted for the workshop. Workshop participants will be invited to submit an abstract for a co-edited volume based on the workshop.
For further information on the study, please feel free to contact us.
The abstract can be read below:
Where exactly is the Global South? Exploring Northern visibilities in digital activism research
The seemingly global nature of hashtag activism makes it difficult to assess what regions are being studied in digital activism research and the extent to which this scholarship is subject to ‘digital bias’ (Marres, 2017). This is of particular concern to scholars who have problematised the dominance of ‘Western’, Global North actors in digital media research whilst also calling for internet research methods to become de-westernised, internationalised, or decolonised (e.g. Badr & Ganter, 2021; Bosch, 2022; Milan & Treré, 2019; Karam & Mutsvairo, 2022; Mutsvairo, 2019; Schoon et al., 2020). While some argue that a ‘decolonial turn’ in digital media research is belatedly occurring (Couldry and Mejia, 2021), questions remain about whether similar trends are evident in digital activism research.
In response to this issue, this paper explores geographic representation in digital activism research. The corpus for the systematic review was created by running queries spanning 21 relevant keywords describing digitally enabled activism on the Scopus database. The final corpus consisted of 315 articles published between 2011 and 2018, which was tested on a range of attributes including methodological approaches and factors for evaluating regionality with a focus on regionally disadvantaged communities (towards capturing “Global South” and semi-periphery regions), incl.: case study origin and location, author affiliation, regional foci of the publishing journals, and researched digital/ social media platform (as tied to specific user demographics).
Results indicate that Global North and non-region specific campaigns dominated digital activism research during this period, particularly in articles featuring digital data. As such, extant research in the field has disproportionately produced what we term Northern Visibilities – privileged demographics & popular platforms of the “Global Majority” (i.e. Global North and privileged economies), above all in research applying software-based approaches.
The paper concludes by outlining a number of epistemological provocations around the extent to which the methods and methodological instruments researchers choose affect which social groups they capture or potentially omit as demographics may become diffused over multiple spaces and language contexts. Challenges in capturing Global South and semi-periphery communities apply, above all, in computational approaches as these are often based on high visibility as well as the API access options platforms provide. This means that researchers may need to rethink (a) where (e.g. which platform spaces) and how disadvantaged and less visible social groups are represented online, (b) which precise social groups digital social research is meant to capture, (c) gaps in digital activism research, above all in relation to “unheard” groups, as well as (d) what these skewed representations mean for inclusive research practice.
Bosch, T. (2022). Decolonizing Digital Methods. Communication Theory, 32(2), 298-302.
Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2021). The decolonial turn in data and technology research: what is at stake and where is it heading?. Information, Communication & Society, 1-17.
Karam, B., & Mutsvairo, B. (2022). Decolonising Political Communication in Africa: Reframing Ontologies (p. 254). Taylor & Francis.
Marres, N. (2017). Digital sociology: The Reinvention of Social Research. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Milan, S., & Treré, E. (2019). Big data from the South (s): Beyond data universalism. Television & New Media, 20(4), 319-335.
Mutsvairo, B. (2019). Challenges facing development of data journalism in non-western societies. Digital Journalism, 7(9), 1289-1294.
Schoon, A., Mabweazara, H. M., Bosch, T., & Dugmore, H. (2020). Decolonising digital media research methods: Positioning African digital experiences as epistemic sites of knowledge production. African Journalism Studies, 41(4), 1-15.
I am sure I was not the only one to find this scene (from Channel 4 sitcom Derry Girls) to be particularly poignant. This week marks 25 years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed. I was a student living in Scotland at the time. My memories of April 1998 primarily revolve around the television coverage of the negotiations at Castle Buildings in Belfast. There are too many to mention here but a few stand out. UK Prime Minister’s (in)famous ‘hand of history’ comment after he earnestly told reporters that this was no time for soundbites. Cameras capturing Brid Rodgers hugging SDLP colleagues in the party’s offices in the early hours of the 10 April, signalling that an Agreement had been reached. And of course there was the televised plenary session on 10 April when US Senator George Mitchell announced an agreement had been reached. The rectangular table with the leaders of the main political parties sitting side-by-side (each with their own name card, as if we needed reminding who they were).
The conversation between Erin and Granda Joe captures the optimism and fear of those who voted in the Good Friday Agreement referendum in May 1998. Like many others, I voted via post and my knowledge of the deal was based entirely on information made available to the public via traditional media. There were no ‘hot takes’ on sites like Twitter informing voters about its contents (perhaps a good thing!). Dial-up internet meant that copies of the text could not be circulated freely online. My dad ended up photocopying the entire document and sending it to me in the post (writing on the first page “some light reading for you”, which still makes me laugh when I see it). In the end, it was an easy decision to vote ‘Yes’. The commitment of paramilitaries to abandon their campaigns of political violence in favour of exclusively peaceful means would mean that future generations would not have to experience the trauma and losses of the past.
Fast forward 25 years and the anniversary of the GFA sees Northern Ireland very much at a crossroads. Admittedly ambitious targets to remove all peace walls by 2023 have not been met, albeit they are dwindling slowly. Paramilitary-style attacks continue to blight what remains a deeply divided society. The continued threat from violent dissident republican groups was illustrated by the attempted murder of PSNI Detective John Caldwell last month. Democratic dysfunction remains a defining feature of the powersharing institutions created under the Agreement. The consociationalist framework of governance means that either of the two largest political parties have the ability to collapse the institutions when it is politically expedient for them to do so. Most recently, the Democratic Unionist Party has boycotted Stormont in protest at the ‘Irish Sea Border’ created by the UK’s EU Withdrawal Agreement. Despite claims from UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak that the Windsor Framework will make the region the “world’s most exciting economic zone”, it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to convince the DUP to go back into government. SDLP leader Colum Eastwood has argued that the real issue is that they do not want to serve under a nationalist First Minister, a likely scenario given that Sinn Féin are now the largest party in the Assembly.
While it may be imperfect, perhaps even unpalatable for some, these are grounds for optimism. The structures that kept the main communities apart are slowly being dismantled. Research shows an increase in the number of mixed relationships and people who self-identify as neither unionist or nationalist. Activism in areas such as women’s reproductive rights continues to transcend sectarian boundaries. A clear majority of Catholic and Protestant residents living in the vicinity of peace walls want them to come down. Moreover, there are the number of lives saved due to the end of the conflict. Former Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently argued there are thousands of people alive today because of the GFA. Now, more than ever, we need political leaders with the bravery of the class of 1998 to protect their hard-won peace.